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Designing Authoritarian Deliberation: How Social Media Platforms Influence 
Political Talk in China 
 
Discussion is often celebrated as a critical element of public opinion and political 
participation. Recently, scholars have suggested that the design and features of specific 
online platforms shape what is politically expressed online and how. Building on these 
findings and drawing on 112 semi-structured qualitative interviews with information and 
communications technology experts and Internet users, we explain how major Chinese social 
media differ in structure and in the company’s motivation. Drawing upon a nationwide 
representative survey and an online experiment, we find that platforms aiming to make users 
a source of information through public, information-centered communication, such as the 
Twitter-like Weibo, are more conducive to political expression; while platforms built to 
optimize building social connections through private, user-centered communication, such as 
the WhatsApp and Facebook-like WeChat, tend to inhibit political expression. These 
technological design effects are stronger when users believe the authoritarian state tolerates 
discussion, but less important when political talk is sensitive. The findings contribute to the 
debate on the political consequences of the Internet by specifying technological and political 
conditions.  
 
Keywords: Authoritarianism; social media; technology; China; political sensitivity; 
deliberation; political talk.  
 
Introduction 
The Internet is often regarded as contributing to the democratic process by giving citizens 
opportunities to engage in political talk and assess conflicting ideas. In spaces for public 
conversation, the Internet is credited with creating a new public sphere like that envisioned by 
Habermas. 1  Other scholars have conversely emphasized the Internet’s potential to damage 
deliberative ideals by facilitating exposure to like-minded views, encouraging incivility, or 
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decreasing satisfaction.2  
While early research focused on assessing the effects of the online environment more 
generally on political discourse, 3  more recently scholars have suggested that the design and 
features of specific online platforms shape how and what is politically expressed online.4 These 
arguments relate to a broader debate about the circumstances that facilitate deliberation with 
positive outcomes for democracy, and whether real-world discussions meet these conditions.5 
Although there is agreement that circumstances for political expression are quite important, little 
is known about what technological designs are conducive to political expression.  
A major obstacle for advancing research in this area are difficulties drawing representative 
conclusions about user activity on popular social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook that 
have a global user base and operate in multiple languages. We take advantage of the Great Chinese 
Firewall and the linguistic preferences of Chinese Internet users locking the majority of Chinese 
users in domestic websites and social media platforms. Focusing on China thus enables us to draw 
representative conclusions about user behaviour on Weibo and WeChat – arguably the two most 
important social media platforms in Chinese political discourse. Furthermore, focusing on China 
allows us to control for variation in political content across platforms. Research on Chinese social 
media demonstrates that political information tends to be, on average, one-sided and tilted towards 
the Chinese Communist Party’s goals across platforms.6 So, differences in political ideology 
across platforms are unlikely to explain differences in user behaviour in survey analysis. To 
strengthen this conclusion, we also test this alternative explanation with an Internet survey 
experiment. 
Our main contribution is to specify which technological design features facilitate or inhibit 
political expression. Based on 112 semi-structured, qualitative interviews with product managers 
 3 
and IT experts at Baidu, Tencent, and Sina Corporation as well as Internet users (see supporting 
information for details), we discovered that technological designs are optimized towards one core 
function supported by a combination of features, which we systematically describe in terms of 
technological affordance to build hypotheses. Based on a nationally representative survey and an 
Internet survey experiment, we find that platforms aiming to make users into a source of 
information through public, information-centered communication, such as the Twitter-like Weibo, 
are more conducive to political expression; while platforms built to optimize building social 
connections through private, user-centered communication, such as the WhatsApp and Facebook-
like WeChat, tend to inhibit political expression.  
Our second contribution is to investigate the role of the authoritarian political context in 
political talk. Scholars debate whether technology strengthens democracy or authoritarianism. 
 Optimists point to the Internet’s possibility to facilitate mobilization and organization, provide 
resources for resistance by political activists, and attract international attention to domestic 
protests; 7  while skeptics stress authoritarian governments’ capability to actively use new 
technologies to their advantage and the Internet’s possibility to prolong the rule of authoritarian 
regimes.8 Critics point out normative bias towards “Western” values and a narrow focus on formal 
politics of the state. They call for a pragmatic approach that examines how Internet users make use 
of the online channels to engage in issues they care about without democratization as the end goal.9 
Here we follow this approach focusing on everyday political talk of Internet users on China’s 
cyberspace taking into account the broader political context. 10 We argue, and find, that the impact 
of technology is stronger when users believe the authoritarian state tolerates discussion, but is less 
important when users approach politically sensitive topics.  
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This article proceeds as follows. We begin with a discussion of authoritarian deliberation 
and online platforms in China, highlight the effects of technological design and the importance of 
political sensitivity in Chinese cyberspace and present our hypotheses based on qualitative 
interviews. To test our hypotheses, we rely on two studies – a nationally representative survey and 
an online survey experiment. Section three presents research design, variable operationalization 
and survey results of the nationally representative survey, while section four introduces research 
design, treatments and results of the online survey experiment. Section five briefly summarizes the 
key empirical findings and section six deals with alternative explanations. Finally, the article 
concludes with political implications of the findings.  
Authoritarian Deliberation and Online Platforms in China 
Although scholars’ definitions of deliberation differ, most would agree that deliberation is a mode 
of communication in which participants in a political process offer and respond to the substance 
of claims, reasons, and diverse perspectives in ways that generate persuasion-based influence. He 
and Warren define deliberation as a mode of communication in which political decision-making 
takes place.11 Authoritarian and democratic deliberation differ in the power distribution of the 
decision resulting from deliberation, with authoritarian deliberation more concentrated and 
hierarchical, and democratic deliberation more dispersed and egalitarian. Jiang has applied the 
concept of authoritarian deliberation to online political discussion, but adopted a broader 
definition, referring to dialogic deliberation and everyday political talk among Chinese Internet 
users.12 This broader definition is also in line with the call for going beyond the democratization 
perspective to examine the Internet’s role in China and focusing on practices of Internet users.13 
Many practices are political without pursing overt political agendas, such as, netizens engaging 
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self-mockery and social critique, debating race and national identity, etc.14 These expressions 
contribute to a more inclusive communication environment preparing grounds for meaningful 
deliberation about public affairs and engaged citizenship.15 Building on this literature we focus on 
two aspects of authoritarian deliberation: everyday talk among netizens on the Chinese Internet 
and the political boundaries of communication defined by the Chinese authoritarian state within 
its territorial boundaries.16 We explore the settings and structure within which political discussion 
occurs.17 Our focus is the extent to which technological design facilitates or hinders political 
expression.  
Effects of Technological Design 
To systematically assess the role of the technological design of social media platforms in shaping 
people’s communication behaviour, we rely on research on affordances from communications and 
computer science. Technology affordances refer to the action possibilities of the technology.18 
Affordance is a relative and relational concept in that the action possibilities are constructed by the 
interactions between users and technologies. Affordances never determine an action, but suggest 
possible actions.19 Studying technological design through the lens of affordances allows us to 
systematically compare and connect design, user perception, and action.  
 Norman, in his focus on technological design, distinguishes between designed affordances 
and action possibilities readily perceived by users.20 A good design will match the designed 
affordances with perceived affordance by users and is achieved through platform architectures. 
Platform architectures, involving the rules or codes that regulate interaction on these platforms, 
are constantly evolving and differ across platforms, depending on the goals, cultures and business 
models of the specific corporations. 21 To understand designed affordance and platform 
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architectures, we need to begin with an understanding of the commercial rationale of social media 
companies. When designing social media platforms, social media companies have a commercial 
rationale - generating revenue, a key source of which is a large user base attracted by the specific 
social media platform’s designed affordances.22 While users have some agency in determining 
how to use a given platform, designed affordances highlight the extent to which social media 
companies channel user actions towards a given platform’s pre-determined core functions. Our 
expert interviews indicate that social media platforms concentrate on one core function per 
platform, addressing one core user need with a commercial, not a political, purpose in mind. 
Sina Weibo was initially a Chinese copy of Twitter, but later started to incorporate more 
social features.23 It is the only vibrant Chinese micro-blogging platform nowadays, with 376 
million monthly active users in September 2017.24 Similar to Twitter, Weibo was designed as a 
public platform with information-centered communication and its core function emphasizes 
production of information: enabling citizens to become the source of information.25 This designed 
affordance is readily perceived by users. In users’ words: “Weibo is like a square […]: everyone 
can voice their opinions, regardless of whether they know each other.” 26  Weibo organizes 
communication based on the content of the shared information, reducing the costs of following 
and sharing information and opinions. For example, forwarding information to others on Weibo 
and spreading information to other platforms each require only a few clicks and very little user 
effort. We call this feature of Weibo - allowing information transmission both within and outside 
of Weibo - outward orientation. Moreover, posts are publicly available to every Weibo user, unless 
users actively restrict access. Weibo’s privacy settings promote public access to information shared 
among large networks of strangers.27 According to one user: 28   
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“Information […] can be shared and forwarded by a significantly larger audience in a very 
short time through Weibo… (On Weibo) I publish a piece of news, others might see and 
forward it; and this chain of forwarding the post can go on from one to thousands of people. 
At the end, everyone knows this issue. This is one reason why many people are still using 
Weibo.”  
Weibo’s key features, namely privacy settings, information-centered communication and outward 
orientation, are built around its core function: making users into the source of information.  
Conversely, WeChat was designed to maintain intimate social relationships between 
friends, family, and acquaintances, satisfying social needs.29 WeChat is the most popular instant 
messenger in China, with 980 million monthly active users in late 2017.30 To achieve its core 
function, WeChat offers more interaction options than Weibo. WeChat divides information 
dissemination and communication about common interests into an instant messenger, similar to 
WhatsApp, called GroupChat, and a Facebook wall called Moments. In both communication 
environments, communication is organized around users, with information dissemination second; 
only links created by public WeChat accounts, certain online websites, or mainstream media 
accounts can be forwarded within WeChat, and it is impossible to forward information to other 
social media platforms. 31  We call this feature of WeChat inward-orientation. Forwarding 
information is costly and time-consuming. As one user said of WeChat: “I usually do not forward 
comments, because it is very complicated.” 32  Moreover, WeChat provides a secure private 
environment by restricting public information dissemination; information is disseminated through 
layers of private acquaintance-based networks, as people can only connect through knowing each 
other personally or a friend’s introduction. In users’ words: “WeChat is like a living room […], 
you will only invite people who you know to your living room”.33 Although WeChat has the 
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function of public accounts enabling public information dissemination, there are restrictions: 
WeChat public account users are allowed to post once per day. And they get to choose what 
comments to display underneath each post, which largely impedes users’ ability to follow 
discussions. 34  These restrictions further demonstrate that information dissemination and 
discussion is placed second on WeChat. WeChat’s key features, namely privacy settings, user-
centered communication and inward orientation, centre around its core function: fostering intimate 
social relationships. 
 We argue that multiple design elements bound by the core function create varying 
circumstances within which discussions occur. Prior studies have focused on individual platforms 
and individual features of these platforms, limiting our ability to understand the impact of 
technological design of social media. For example, studies concentrating on the communication 
structure on micro-blogs have found that Twitter and Weibo  afford information dissemination and 
online expression.35 Features, such as, public tweet, follower relations, the retweet network of 
“who retweet whom”, are found to be fundamental to information dissemination and expression 
on Weibo.36 WeChat’s restriction to private networks has not been found to be correlated with 
discussion of social and political topics.37 In contrast to these prior studies we emphasize the 
importance of the combination of features in support of the designed affordances. Due to 
differences between Weibo and WeChat in communication mode (user- or information-centered) 
and privacy settings (public or private), we derive the following hypothesis: Weibo users are more 
likely to voice opinions about politics (Weibo hypothesis). 
WeChat’s division into GroupChat and Moments provides further opportunity to explore 
the extent to which technological design matters within one platform. Similar to the Facebook 
wall, Moments facilitates information dissemination from one person to many, but unlike 
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Facebook, it only allows users who know each other to communicate.  One interviewee described 
Moments as: “singing in a karaoke bar whereby no matter how loud you sing, it won’t transmit the 
boundary of the bar to outside”.38 Moments allows users to disseminate information to all or some 
of their contacts, but grouping is time-consuming and inconvenient. 39  Because of these 
technological limitations interrupting the flow of information, on WeChat users prefer to discuss 
on GroupChat, where following a discussion is easier. An instant messenger, GroupChat allows 
for real-time group conversations in various formats, such as text, voice, and short videos. These 
features allow people to personalize communication. Users can invite a friend to join a group of 
people who previously didn’t know each other. Users describe these differences between 
GroupChat and Moments as: “I will select a few WeChat groups to share information and voice 
opinion, while I seldom post information and opinions onto my Moments. …... Discussion takes 
place more frequently and can dive deeper in a private setting (such as WeChat GroupChat).”40 
GroupChat creates an environment for discussion, while Moments is more like the karaoke bar, 
where one person disseminates an opinion to many people in an audience. We therefore 
hypothesize that WeChat users who join GroupChat are more likely to discuss political issues 
online than WeChat users who do not join GroupChat (WeChat GroupChat hypothesis). 
Importance of Political Sensitivity in Chinese Cyberspace 
Although social media, blogs and micro-blogs in particular, is found to provide a medium for 
sophisticated political expression41, the boundaries of political expression are manipulated and 
controlled by the Chinese state.42 To some extent, the Chinese state tolerates and even actively 
promotes online discussion of public affairs. The CCP has actively shaped the public’s perception 
of democracy with an emphasis on managed political participation and the importance of the 
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party’s leadership.43 On the one hand, Chinese public officials use online discussion to obtain 
feedback on the government’s policies and goals.44 On issues where mainstream media and the 
state do not set the agenda, activists have used blogs to build communities.45 
 On the other hand, the state also builds structures that function as a “safety belt” to control 
the content of the discussion and guide it in a direction supportive of the goals and policies of 
authoritarian rulers, if necessary. China has built an extensive system for Internet surveillance and 
manipulation. It includes: the configuration of Internet gateway infrastructure 46 , blocking 
websites, filtering, automated review47, Internet policing48, regulation of Internet service providers 
and web administrators 49 , and employment of web commentators to shape and alter public 
debate50. As the state clamps down on political expression, Internet users have grown savvy at 
expressing themselves through political satire and ironic use of politically correct language to 
subvert controls.51 
This balance between opening and limiting space for public discourse is achieved through 
institutions. Chinese media are embedded in the Chinese political system, and, through this 
institutional infrastructure, the Chinese Communist Party maintains the capacity to manage 
boundaries of public discourse and concentrates on the interest of political survival.52 Since 2014, 
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), found by the leadership under Xi Jinping, has 
become the more important institution in managing online information compared to the 
propaganda system.53 In relying on institutions to restrict boundaries of public discourse, China 
resembles other one-party regimes that have a greater capacity to restrict information flows and 
thus can use market-based and new media to their advantage.54  
People learn about the boundaries for public discourse by discovering the rules these 
institutions impose and the rules of the official language game.55 Despite changes in the opening 
 11 
and closing of discursive space over time, generally speaking topics become more sensitive when 
they criticize political leaders or may lead to collective action and instability.56 Not all discussion 
or actions on sensitive topics will incur coercion, because the state exercises uncertainty on the 
ground with regards to what is tolerated and what is forbidden.57  
Chinese social media companies are embedded in this extensive institutional infrastructure, 
through which political elites enforce boundaries for political discourse. These boundaries affect 
users’ communication behaviours. A comparative study of users’ microblogging behaviours on 
Twitter and Weibo demonstrates that in contrast to Twitter, Weibo users avoid talking about 
organizations such as political parties or other institutions.58 Because these boundaries are similar 
across social media platforms, we hypothesize that technological design affects political 
expression on non-sensitive political issues, but not when issues are sensitive (sensitivity 
hypothesis). 
Study 1: National Survey 
Data and Measurement 
We first use a nationally representative survey studying media behaviours and engagement, 
conducted by a Chinese university research center from May-July, 2014, henceforth called “media 
survey.” The survey was randomly sampled using the global positioning system (GPS) sampling 
technique. GPS sampling randomly selects respondents’ geographical location, thus including 
migrant workers, a large social group excluded in most Chinese surveys.59 The questionnaire was 
implemented by experienced, trained interviewers in face-to-face conversations. Information 
about the media survey including sampling information, descriptive survey statistics and the 
Chinese question wording are included in the supporting information. 
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Measuring Voicing Opinions 
We created three dependent variables reflecting political discussion on topics with varying 
sensitivity: Discussing non-sensitive political topics online is an additive scale of two questions. 
The first asked how frequently respondents voiced opinions or commented on online current affairs 
or political news (Wangluo Shishi Zhengzhi Xinwen); the second asked how frequently respondents 
discussed current affairs or political news with friends online (Wangyou). According to our 
interviews, the Chinese phrasing “current affairs or political news” prompts people to think about 
non-sensitive, open topics tolerated and even encouraged in Chinese public discourse, such as 
health care reform, local news, anti-corruption campaigns, and major international news.  An 
online survey experiment confirmed that netizens were more likely to report commenting on 
politics when the term contains “current affairs” (Shishi).60 Discussing non-sensitive topics online 
ranges from 0 to 6, whereby higher numbers represent more frequent discussion (Cronbach’s α = 
0.84). Sensitive political discussion online was captured via two dummy variables representing 
two distinct types of politically-sensitive content in China - whether respondents had ever 
criticized government officials or policy online, and whether they had ever discussed protest, 
demonstrations, or collective action online. While we would expect some bias in respondents’ 
answers on discussing protest, prior research demonstrates that survey respondents feel free to give 
truthful answers to such questions. A list experiment revealed no evidence for social-desirability 
bias regarding a similar question.61  
Measuring Technological Design 
In the first set of regressions among all Chinese Internet users surveyed, our key independent 
variables, Weibo use and WeChat use, were dummy variables, measured by asking whether 
respondents had used Weibo or WeChat in the past week. However, as explained earlier, WeChat 
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is a multi-functional platform split into Moments and GroupChat and only GroupChat facilitates 
online discussion. In order to test the WeChat GroupChat hypothesis, we conducted a second set 
of regressions among WeChat users only. In this set of regressions, the key independent variable, 
GroupChat use, is a dummy variable indicating whether respondents reported participating in 
GroupChat. Because the question wording also included GroupChat on the social media platform 
QQ, we included a dummy variable for QQ use as a control variable when testing the WeChat 
GroupChat hypothesis. 
Control Variables 
The extent to which social media users comment online may be influenced by numerous user 
characteristics external to the platform, chiefly a person’s online social network size62, frequency 
of use63, privacy concerns64, and interest in the content distributed on the platform65. In order to 
address these possible alternative explanations, all models controlled for online network size, 
intensity of media use, interest in politics, VPN use, political efficacy, political trust, nationalism, 
and socio-demographics, which were recoded to run from 0 to 1. Details regarding control 
variables are included in the supporting information.  
Survey Results 
To test the Weibo and sensitivity hypotheses, we estimate the relationship between WeChat and 
Weibo use on voicing political opinions. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for non-
sensitive political discussion, and probit regressions for each of the sensitive political discussion 
variables. Detailed statistical results for all variables are included in Tables 1 and 2.  
First, we investigate the relationship between WeChat and Weibo use on voicing opinions. 
As shown in Figure 1, Weibo use is highly positively correlated with Discussing non-sensitive 
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political topics. Weibo users discuss non-sensitive politics occasionally to sometimes, while 
WeChat users almost never do. Conversely, Weibo use is negatively correlated with Criticizing 
government officials online and unrelated to Discussing protest online. These results confirm the 
Weibo hypothesis and the sensitivity hypothesis: while Weibo facilitates the discussion of non-
sensitive political topics, it appears to have a null, or even negative, effect for sensitive political 
topics. WeChat use, meanwhile, was statistically indistinguishable from non-WeChat use when 
discussing non-sensitive and sensitive topics. As expected, WeChat hindered political expression 
compared to Weibo, even on non-sensitive topics. 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here 
Second, we explore whether using the WeChat GroupChat function facilitates political 
expression compared to non-use (and therefore solely using Moments). Table 2 and Figure 2 
display results for the WeChat GroupChat hypothesis. Internet users who do not use WeChat 
occasionally discuss non-sensitive political topics. WeChat users tend to express their political 
views even more rarely, unless they use GroupChat. The interaction term coefficient between 
WeChat use and GroupChat is positive (0.74) and statistically significant. This means that WeChat 
users who use GroupChat are roughly comparable to Internet users who do not use WeChat when 
expressing political views online. Only the GroupChat function, not Moments, achieves this effect, 
confirming the WeChat GroupChat hypothesis. 
Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 about here 
Together, these findings suggest that incentives built into WeChat and Weibo’s 
technological design in order to optimize towards their core function facilitate political expression 
on Weibo and inhibit it on WeChat. Within WeChat, GroupChat facilitates political expression. 
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These findings are correlations based on nationally representative survey data. To investigate 
further whether the effect is driven by affordance, we therefore turn to an Internet survey 
experiment. 
Study 2: Online Survey Experiment 
Data, Method, and Measurement 
The experiment was conducted during an online survey sampling 1,489 Internet users from an 
online panel of over 1.6 million Chinese Internet users from May-June 2016. To increase external 
validity, we rely on available population parameters of Internet users - age, gender, education level 
and provincial level distribution of IP addresses - to draw a quota sample and then post-stratify the 
sample on core variables of interest - self-reported social media behaviour. This increases our 
confidence that results are generalizable to Chinese Internet users. Detailed sampling, post-
stratification information, and Chinese question-wording are displayed in the supporting 
information. 
The experimental treatments concern a specific issue: air pollution. Social media 
discussion on air pollution is a typical non-sensitive issue considered social but politically 
relevant.66 Air pollution is considered by Internet users in our interviews an “open” topic where 
information can be freely circulated.67 We selected a post mocking the seriousness of smog in 
Beijing that was widely circulated on both Weibo and WeChat in Winter 2015. The post shows an 
image stating: “This is not a thriller, but public square dancing on an early winter morning.” To 
our knowledge, this post was not censored by the Chinese propaganda authorities. 78% percent of 
our sample (n=1,118) had received the picture before.  
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Treatment  
To control for content, the treatment varied not the image but the technological design of the 
platforms (see Figure 3). The 1,192 respondents who self-reported using both platforms (Weibo 
and WeChat) were randomly assigned to one of two groups: one group saw the picture within 
Weibo, where forward and comment icons are displayed underneath the picture; the other group 
saw the same picture on WeChat Moments, where forwarding is hidden in a menu on the right-
hand side. As explained earlier, Moments, an integrated component of WeChat, allow users to 
disseminate information, yet the limitations built into its technological design make commenting 
and following a discussion more costly in terms of time and effort than on Weibo. Treatments were 
only shown to users who reported using both WeChat and Weibo and were, therefore, familiar 
with both platforms.68 After seeing one of these two pictures, participants were asked: “If you 
receive this picture on TREATMENT [Weibo, WeChat], what would you do?”  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Obviously, these treatments have limitations because they prime users to think about the 
specific platforms, so the effects may be partially affected by perceptions of these platforms not 
related to its technological features. To account for these perceptions, we conducted manipulation 
checks concerning whether people’s perceptions of differing political content or censorship on the 
platforms correlated with the treatment. A balancing table and detailed information regarding the 
manipulation check are displayed in the supporting information. The results are discussed below.  
Measuring Voicing Opinions 
We use three measures to assess whether the treatment encourages people to voice an opinion 
about the issue. All measures are dummy variables. Forwarding with comments, and Forwarding 
 17 
to other social media platforms indicate whether a person reported forwarding the message within 
the same platform or to other platforms, while Discussing with friends indicates whether a person 
reported discussing air pollution with friends (online or offline).  
Experimental Results  
Figure 4 displays the results of probit regression models on three dependent variables in the 
experiment.  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
We detect significantly more positive effects when receiving the image on Weibo for all 
three measures. People who receive the message on Weibo were 17% more likely to forward the 
message, adding their own comment on the same platform, compared to receiving the message on 
WeChat, significant at the 0.1 level. These effects increase in size and statistical significance for 
forwarding the message to other social media platforms: people who receive the message on Weibo 
are 21% more likely to forward it compared to those receiving it on WeChat, significant at the 0.05 
level. When asked about real-life actions, people were 31% more willing to report that they would 
discuss the issue with friends after receiving the message on Weibo, significant at the 0.01 level. 
Weibo’s design encouraged people to more strongly voice their political opinions than WeChat, 
confirming the Weibo hypothesis.  
Summary 
We systematically compare social media platforms concerning technological design and 
investigate its effects on political expression in an authoritarian context. Our survey findings 
support the hypothesis that Weibo’s technological design facilitates the expression of political 
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views, while WeChat limits it. However, these results depend on the boundaries for political 
discourse set by the state. As expected, technological design only matters when discussing non-
sensitive political topics Our experiment further demonstrates a strong positive relationship 
between receiving a message and voicing an opinion on Weibo, on other social media platforms, 
and with friends. Receiving the message on WeChat had a more limited positive effect. Our survey 
analysis reveals that this positive effect is mainly driven by WeChat’s GroupChat function. People 
who solely use Moments are the least likely to voice political views, while GroupChat users are 
more likely to do so. This positive correlation can only be detected by including the interaction 
term between GroupChat and WeChat. Even though the correlations we detect may appear small, 
when considering each network’s aggregate number of users - 376 million monthly active Weibo 
users69 and 980  million monthly active WeChat users70 - they are quite impressive.  
Alternative Explanations and Caveats 
Our results allow us to address several alternative explanations. First, one might argue that our 
technological design measures are not specific enough to pick up effects. This argument refers to 
correlations of WeChat and Weibo use, displayed in figure 1. In response, we found evidence that 
other factors, especially a person’s network size, privacy concerns, and political efficacy, influence 
political talk on non-sensitive topics online. Since we control for these alternative explanations in 
the regression, we are fairly confident that the remaining relationship picked up by Weibo and 
WeChat use is mainly driven by the platforms’ technological design. To strengthen our confidence 
about technological design, we also considered WeChat’s separation into GroupChat and 
Moments, finding evidence that GroupChat use is positively correlated with voicing opinions. 
Moreover, the experimental treatment displays the design of both platforms, allowing us to tie 
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results more directly to technological design. 
 A similar argument could be made about our experimental treatments, which prompt 
people to think about their perceptions of platforms as a whole, including their content (i.e., not a 
feature of technological design). To address these concerns, after treatment, we asked experimental 
participants to compare Weibo and WeChat on perceived political content, censorship, and 
functions associated with technological design. We detected no differences across treatment 
groups regarding perceived censorship or political content associated with the platform. However, 
we found that participants were more likely to choose Weibo over WeChat regarding the 
platform’s affordance for political expression after viewing the Weibo treatment, further 
strengthening our confidence that the treatments manipulated technological design features and 
users’ perceived affordances of the features. 
 Finally, one may argue that face-to-face surveys do not produce reliable results about 
political expression in an authoritarian regime, because people are incentivized to hide their true 
beliefs and political behaviour. It is commonly known that large numbers of Chinese netizens 
criticize leaders and policy online; Chinese netizens also organize collective action online. While 
social desirability bias is obviously an important concern that must be addressed in surveys in 
China and other authoritarian contexts, we believe this bias does not explain the results presented 
here. Survey research in China finds response bias to some politically-sensitive questions71, but 
not on all questions related to politics. For example, regarding criticism of political leaders, a list 
experiment revealed no evidence of social desirability bias.72 At least regarding voicing criticism 
of leaders, prior research demonstrates that survey respondents feel free to give truthful answers 
in face-to-face surveys conducted by trained interviewers. We are therefore confident that the 
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conditional effect of technological design depending on political issue sensitivity can be picked up 
in the face-to-face media survey.  
Conclusion  
Advocates and critics of deliberation emphasize that the conditions under which political talk takes 
place influence how and what is expressed. Our results reveal how social media platform design 
contributes to political expression online. Unlike previous studies, we do not argue that one 
specific platform design feature, mostly social network structure, explains differences across social 
media platforms. As our expert interviews reveal, technological features cannot be separated from 
one another, as together they create a commercial product that optimizes one core function. 
Understanding this core function is key to understanding the incentive structure built into social 
media. We argue that the core function and technological design supporting this core function 
matter for political talk online. Moreover, we provide experimental evidence supporting that the 
effect of technological design is tied to its core function.   
Rather than emphasizing the affordance of a specific feature, we suggest that future 
research consider a larger set of technological features (i.e. information-centered versus user-
centered, public versus private, network structure and size) linked together by the designed 
affordance. Social media research is already moving in this direction, as scholars have started to 
move away from focusing on Facebook or Twitter towards conducting comparative analysis 
between platforms. These studies indicate that Twitter tends to be used to engage with breaking 
news and Facebook to plan and organize collective action during protest.73 Since Weibo and 
WeChat were inspired by their American counterparts, future research may probe whether Twitter 
also promotes political discussion more strongly than WhatsApp or Facebook. 
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Finally, our results have important implications for discussions about the Internet’s 
political consequences. This study reinforces the notion that the effects of new communication 
technologies depend on a political context. Diamond finds that the impact of new communication 
technology depends on the state’s political organization and strategy.74 In relying on institutions 
to restrict boundaries of public discourse, China resembles other one-party regimes that have a 
greater capacity to restrict information flows and thus can use market-based and new media to 
their advantage.75 Our findings imply that the Chinese state is able to establish boundaries for 
political discourse through these institutions. Our findings show that concerns about these 
boundaries override the effects of the communication structure imposed on users within social 
media platforms. Of course, Chinese netizens continue to criticize political leaders and discuss 
protest online, as much work on the Chinese Internet has demonstrated, but talk about politically-
sensitive topics does not seem to depend much on the technological setting within which such 
discussion occurs. In other words, whether Chinese political discourse moves towards WeChat or 
Weibo only matters when non-sensitive topics are discussed; concerns about criticizing officials 
and talk about protest are equally likely to affect users across platforms. To understand the impact 
of social media on political expression we need to take into account how they are designed and the 
broader political context within which political discourse takes place.  
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Weibo user 0.40*** -0.33** -0.29 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.19) 
WeChat user -0.11 -0.46 -0.42 
(0.11) (0.35) (0.44) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Size of online network 2.25*** 1.58*** 1.21** 
(0.32) (0.57) (0.56) 
Frequency of getting information 
from traditional media (TV) 
-0.17 -0.37 -0.99*** 
(0.20) (0.25) (0.19) 
Frequency of getting information on 
social media 
0.03 0.04 0.13 
(0.18) (0.27) (0.40) 
Following political news online -0.17 0.90*** 0.68*** 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.24) 
Trust in government 0.53 1.54*** 1.92*** 
(0.36) (0.48) (0.69) 
Proud to be Chinese -0.53* -1.77*** -1.30** 
(0.30) (0.54) (0.60) 
Political efficacy 0.83*** 0.39 0.42 
(0.24) (0.35) (0.30) 
Uses VPN 0.50** -0.07 -0.04 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.31) 
Age -0.85 -1.13 -0.01 
(1.13) (1.09) (1.62) 
Age squared 0.81 1.05 -0.81 
(1.40) (1.63) (2.40) 
Education 0.31 0.32 0.23 
(0.21) (0.27) (0.41) 
Male 0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
(0.09) (0.14) (0.22) 
Migrant worker -0.18 0.02 -0.01 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.15) 
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CCP member -0.40** -0.23 -0.41 
(0.16) (0.28) (0.27) 
Constant 0.10 -1.96*** -1.96** 
 (0.40) (0.67) (0.81) 
Observations 1,124 1,132 1,132 
R-squared  0.25   
Pseudo R-squared  0.18 0.21 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Survey design characteristics taken into account; Pseudo R-
squared values obtained from an equivalent regression with survey characteristics not taken into account.   
*** p/z<0.01, ** p/z<0.05, * p/z<0.1 
Data: Media Survey, 2014. 
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Table 2: OLS Regression Results of WeChat GroupChat Use on Non-sensitive Political 
Discussion among Internet Users 
VARIABLES Discussing Non-sensitive Political Topics Online 
WeChat user -0.18 
(0.15) 




GroupChat x WeChat user interaction 0.80*** 
(0.30) 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Weibo user 0.41*** 
(0.15) 
QQ user 0.08 
(0.21) 
GroupChat x QQ user interaction -0.19 
(0.26) 
Size of online network 2.26*** 
(0.32) 
Frequency of getting information from 
traditional media (TV) 
-0.17 
(0.20) 




Following political news online -0.16 
(0.25) 
Trust in government 0.54 
(0.36) 
Proud to be Chinese -0.52* 
(0.30) 
Political efficacy 0.83*** 
(0.25) 










Migrant worker -0.18* 
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 (0.11) 






Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Survey design characteristics taken into account. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 












Figure 1: Survey Results on Weibo and Sensitivity Hypotheses a 
Data: Media survey, 2014 
 
a Figure displays predicted value for OLS regression displayed in table 1 (left-hand column) and predicted 
probabilities for probit maximum likelihood regressions displayed in table 1 (middle and right-hand 
column). Predicted probabilities of WeChat and Weibo were calculated, keeping all other variables 




Figure 2: Survey Results on WeChat GroupChat Hypothesis1 
Data: Media survey, 2014 
 
 
1 Figure displays predicted values for the OLS regression displayed in table 2. Predicted values were 
calculated for Internet users who do not use WeChat, Weibo or QQ (“neither”) as a baseline for 
comparison and people who use WeChat (but not Weibo or QQ) as GroupChat use changes. 
Weibo Group:  
If you receive the following picture on Weibo, what would 
you do on Weibo? 
WeChat Group:  
If you receive the following picture on WeChat, what would 
you do on WeChat? 
 
  
Figure 3: Experimental Treatments 
Data: Online Media Use Survey, 2016 
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Figure 4 Effects of Experimental Treatments 
Data: Online Media Use Survey, 2016  
